The crew's first two sorties had been uneventful, both attacking the Dortmund-Ems canal, firstly at Mittelland then at Ladbergen.  No fighters or flak were seen, cloud obscured the target on both occasions and their bombs were brought back to base.  The Station Commander of RAF Waddington, Group Captain David Bonham-Carter sometimes flew with new crews on their first op., apparently not always the reassuring experience that he meant it to be since he was "now out of condition (having previously been a very good test pilot), stone deaf but still flew, frightening the unfortunates who had to fly with him and horrifying the Control Tower WAAF operators, whom he completely ignored." (Wing Cmdr Rollo Kingsford-Smith RAAF).  

Group Captain David Bonham-Carter, second from the right, with King George VI whilst at Waddington.  Bonham-Carter was affectionately known as TR9 because of his prominent hearing aid.  TR9 was actually an item of radio equipment used on the Lancaster.

Tom Drennan's diary entry for 3 March reveals the canal as being a "priority plus target."  The lack of an entry for Sunday 4th March is a poignant "statement" to the crew's fate.

The problem from the bomber crews' viewpoint was that the German defences were always very well prepared.  The German Wurzburg radars plotted the bombers' direction of attack, and, from previous experience, a wall of flak was placed in the Lancasters’ path: there was no flying around it, the crews had to fly into it on the given heading.  F/O Jim Morris had attacked this target before, though only at night.  On 1st January he was part of a daylight operation bombing the canal.  This is what he wrote:

"There was hardly a cloud in the sky as we passed over the picture postcard landscape.  Then I saw ahead what we had been through during night operations.  I had heard of a cubic mile of "flak" but had never seen it.  Could we fly through this and return?  The first wave were entering the fringe, there was no turning back.  I had never bombed from this height before - all, except the Urft dam - had been night ops from lower heights.  How would we fare - fighters were few - flak was so heavy - I was still not 100%. (Jim had been grounded because of a heavy head cold but was suddenly declared "fully fit flying duties" for this maximum effort New Year present)  All we could do was hold position starboard of leader and hope.  Everything was so clear cut as we moved into the box of flak - the "gaggle" maintained its position and Bob (bomb aimer) was beginning his ritual."  Extract from "They flew from Waddington" by H M Blundell.  Jim Morris added that one of the reasons that he remembers this op. was because he didn't realise what defences there were at the canal.  He went on to say that even when he went again at night it had lost its visual impact.  Jim was flying NG485 on 3 March when ME453 was lost.

Over 200 aircraft had to bomb a narrow target in 15 to 20 minutes.  The picture below shows the River Glane, or Mulhenbruch, flowing underneath the canal. A breach of the canal at this point would send water flowing down onto the lower level, thereby draining the canal.  Attempts were made with netting to disguise the course of the Glane.

The weather forecast for RAF Waddington was described as “fit”, and so it proved to be; it was a bright sunny day with a light west to west-north-westerly wind, as it had been for the previous two days, though there had been no operational flights during those days.  Sunset was at 17.46, three-quarters of an hour before the first Lancaster took off from Waddington.

The moon was a waning gibbous, 83% of the disc was illuminated, with moonrise being at 22.37.  This would be after bombs had been dropped and the Lancasters were on their way back to base.

This is the surface chart for 3 March 1945 at 0600 GMT.  This would probably be the chart on which Bomber Command based the forecast for the operation.  A 1200 GMT chart would have been used to amend the forecast as necessary.  (Route marked in red)

The surface chart for the same day at 1800 GMT showing that for the route the pressure pattern did not change greatly during the day.

The 700 millibar (10000 ft chart) for the day at 0600 GMT.  (Route marked in red).  The charts show the following: Departure from Waddington: Wind W-WNW 2-5 knots, excellent visibility, no significant low cloud but patches of altocumulus above 10000 ft.
Waddington to mid-Channel: No significant cloud.  Excellent visibility.  5000 ft wind 350-010 15 knots.  Freezing level 2000 ft. Mid-Channel to target: Mostly variable 6/10 -  8/10 CUSC base 3000 ft tops 5000-6000 ft. Light icing in cloud tops.  Isolated wintry (sleet or soft hail) showers.  Mostly good visibility except in showers.  No significant cloud at 10000 ft, but isolated tops to 12000 ft near target.  Wind at 10000 ft 350-360 40-45 knots.  Return to base: Little change except for thickening ACAS above 8000 ft on northbound leg over England.  (With thanks to Brian (Lyffe) ex-RAF Met. for the charts and his interpretations.

The forecast over the target was 5/10th or less cloud with cloud base at 8000 ft and tops at 12 – 14000 ft.  The actual weather was not so good, (some crews remarked on the “poor met.”)  7 - 9/10th strato-cumulus with tops at 5 – 6000 ft, the aqueduct itself being in 10/10th cloud with layers of thin stratus down to 3500 ft at the time of the attack.  There was a polar air mass over Spitzbergen which was moving south over the North Sea towards Germany.

The synoptic chart for 3 March 1945 showing the colder air mass moving south.

In the Control Tower, all is being readied for the night's operation.

The anxious moments of waiting are over, time to get on-board and get on with the job.

The first aircraft, NG401 (JO-G) piloted by Gus Belford of 463 squadron, took off at 18.31. ME453 (PO-L) was the 28th of the 30 aircraft from Waddington to take off at 18.53.  Fifteen Lancasters came from each squadron, they joined a force of 182 other Lancasters and 10 Mosquitoes.  A simultaneous attack was to take place on the synthetic oil plant at Kamen: H hour was 22.00 for both targets.  “Newhaven” controlled direct bombing would be used at Ladbergen and the approach would be heavily “windowed” to confuse German radar, with an airborne radar-jamming “Mandrel” screen employed to try to counter the German Freya early warning system.  A diversionary sweep was carried out over the North Sea and feint attacks were made over Meppen and Emden. 

An extract from Doug Wheeler's navigation chart aboard NG401 showing the route south from Waddington, setting off at 19.07 after an 18.31 take-off, with the first turning point over Reading before leaving English skies near Beachy Head.  With thanks to Doug's widow Thelma for providing a copy of Doug's charts and logs for that night.

The maps shown below have been constructed using GoogleEarth and the navigational data given in Doug Wheeler's log.  A "narrative" of the flight is included in the sub-section to this one titled "3 March 45".

From the Base to A (Reading), the rectified air speed (RAS) was180kts, the height 5000', the outside temperature was -6° C and the course 192° True.     

From A they flew aross the Channel to position B, crossing the coast at Le Touquet.  The RAS was 170kts, height 8000', temperature was -9° C and the course 112° True.   

From B to turning point C, position 50 15N 03 20E. The RAS was 175kts, height 9000', air temperature -10° C,   course 095° True.

The long leg across Belgium from C to D, position 51 35N 05 25E. The RAS remained at 175kts and the height at 9000'. Air temperature -10° C, and course 032° True

See above.

Turning point D to E 54 19N 06 40E. RAS was 175kts and height    9000'. Temperature was -10° C, course 058° True.

The final leg from E - th target at 52 09N 07 43E. RAS stayed at 175kts, height 9000', temperature at -10° C, course 051° True.

A detail of the map above showing the crash site of Lancaster ME453, 3 miles almost due west of the target at position 52 08N, 07 38E..

The target on the Dortmund-Ems canal shown with a triangle and "H-hour" (first wave of bombs) of 22.00

German controllers started plotting the advancing British aircraft at 19.11 hours, whilst the Mandrel screen transmitted by the B17s of 100 Group which attempted to "hide" the bomber stream began operating over Belgium at 20.45, as the Lancasters flew over France prior to turning north-east.  Immediately 35 German nightfighters were scrambled from airfields around the Ruhr, most being directed towards Duisberg, the controllers anticipating another raid on the industrial heart of the country.  Major Schnaufer took off from Gutersloh at 21.30 in his Bf110G-4, the first clear plots on the Geman radars of the bombers having developed about 15 minutes earlier as they emerged from behind the Mandrel screen.  The supporting "Window" spoof force was fanned out over a 30km front, but the controllers focussed on the developing plots heading towards Ladbergen.  The force attacking Kamen turned south-eastwards, though this move was not immediately recognised by the Luftwaffe defences.  The bombing at Ladbergen started at 21.47, however a number of Nachtjager had already successfully infiltrated the bomber stream. (Details from "The Nachtjagd War Diaries by Theo Boiten and Rod Mackenzie)

A map showing the route to and from the target, but specifically the (Mandrel) screen position and in the lower portion the spoof window operation heading towards Bonn.  (Courtesy of the Department of Research and Information Services, DoRIS, RAF Museum Hendon.)

The first pilot to report a "kill" was Geschwaderkommodore Major Heinz Schnaufer  of NJG4, the top-scoring night-fighter ace of the Luftwaffe, at 21.55 north west of the target area, his 117th claim, his 118th claim came 9 minutes later at 22.04, the former at an altitude of 2.500m (8,200 feet), the latter at 2,300m (7546 feet).

Hptm Hermann Greiner of Stab IV./NJG 1 based at Dortmund claimed two Lancasters shot down at 21.57 and 22.12.  Uffz. Wenzel of III./NJG4 filed the following combat report on landing, having witnessed Greiner's first kill:

"Nothing picked up by SN2 (his airborne radar) as SN2 u/s.  Five enemy sightings, four-engined, presumably Lancasters, including four on reciprocal course, one flying at an angle of about 40° to course.  Height 2.000 to 2.400 metres.  Vectored onto last four-engined to attack, at first too low, and slowly gained height while approximating speed, and then approached to within 400 metres.  Owing to approach of an enemy fighter from behind, four-engined shot at already from 400 metres with oblique armament.  Then forced to take evasive action against enemy fighter.  No hits observed.  At 21.57 hours, one four-engined shot down over target by Me110, clearly observed."  (Details from "The Nachtjagd War Diaries by Theo Boiten and Rod Mackenzie)

Other high scoring night-fighter pilots in the area were Martin Drewes and Josef Kraft, the former claiming a Lancaster destroyed at 22.13 and Kraft two at 21.59 and 22.07.  At this stage of the war, German pilots usually logged their "abschuss" according to the grid reference (planquadrate) that was used to help vector them whilst tracking the bomber stream, in this case grid "HQ".  Each rectangle in the grid measured 15 minutes of latitude by 30 minutes of longitude, representing approximately 360 square miles of area.  The probability is that Heinz Schnaufer was the most likely candidate for destroying ME453, though Greiner's two claims of being "in the Dortmund area" were probably nearer to Ladbergen. 

The Master Bomber, whose task it was to direct the attack, ordering the bombs to be placed in specific areas, was Wing Commander Stubbs.  Master Bombers usually flew below the main force, gaining as clear a view as possible of the target, noting the accuracy of the attack and redirecting the aiming points as necessary via their VHF radios. 

Over the canal there was low cloud, a smoke screen, moderate heavy flak from the 88mm guns, some predicted flak at 14000 feet and intense light flak from 15 to 20 vierlings.  F/O Townley of 463 squadron noted in his report that “it appeared the flak defences were waiting for us this time, a little more intense than usual.”  Sergeant Cy March, rear gunner of ME487, PO-H, wrote this account later: “The next was a night op. to the Dortmund-Ems Canal again and this one told me that things weren’t going to be easy, not at all.  We took off at 18.41 and got to the target without incident but, what a change from the last one.  It was like Hell’s kitchen, with the glow of red target indicators, flares reflecting on the clouds with an unearthly glow, and we were bobbing and weaving to avoid flak pretty violently at times.  It was like a kaleidoscope, with flak flashes and photographic flares going like lightning.  In one of those flashes I saw a Lancaster diving and twisting with both inboard engines burning, then she was gone.  In another flash I saw a Ju 88 nightfighter about 200 yards on our port quarter and going diagonally to starboard."

F/O "Blue" Hudson flying in SW268 (JO-R) of 463 squadron, noted "Flak little more intense than last time.  If T.I.s were accurate the attack should have been successful.  A/c was seen twelve minutes before "H" hour flying with his downward recognition lights on."  The downward recognition lights were under the rear section of the fuselage, just forward of the tailwheel.  The switches for these lights are just to the left of the throttle pedestal and below the blind flying panel. The downward ID lights could quite easily be left on because as far as I'm aware, there was no indicator showing they were on, and the switches were behind the control column, so they could be hidden.  (With thanks to Eddie Walters for details of the lights and switches)

Could this aircraft have been the inexperienced, apprehensive and probably excited crew of ME453 just before their destruction at 21.55?  The Luftwaffe experten in the skies that night hardly needed that kind of encouragement to latch onto their targets.

Lancaster SW268 (JO-R) of 463 squadron flown by F/O Blue Hudson.  (With thanks to Andy Smith for the photograph)

This schematic attempts to show how crowded the skies were above the target in the few minutes after H-hour, ie bomb-release times.  The aircraft represented are only those from 463 and 467 squadron that actually bombed the target, with information taken from the ORBs. 

Add to this picture the Lancasters of 9, 49, 50, 189, 207 and 227 squadrons to gain some idea of just how crowded the skies were.  9 squadrons' Lancasters were carrying single Tallboy bombs weighing 12000lbs, fitted with half-hour fuses.  Their ORBs show that they bombed within the same height range as the rest of the Main Force but approached the target from different directions, most within the range of 036° to 060° True, though two bombed at around 340° True.  The Lancasters' speeds are recorded as 190kts RAS.  The risk of collision or of being hit by bombs from aircraft above can be very readily appreciated.

Three aircraft and crews were lost from 467 squadron that night, including Wing Commander Eric Le Page Langlois, the new squadron commander. Five of the crew were killed and FO Willmot and FO Taylor were POW’s. Those killed are listed as missing and their names are commemorated on the Memorial to the Missing at Runnymede, Surrey, UK.

In a later statement the then Flt Lt Taylor (Rear Gunner)said "A/c on fire in bomb bay. Captain orders bale out and all acknowledge. No one seemed injured and A/c in perfect control. Fighters set us on fire. Destroyed the enemy aircraft ME110. Saw it burning on the ground when we landed. (This claim is not substantiated since no Luftwaffe aircraft are recorded as being lost that night.)  Crashed about two minutes from the target on German side of canal.

Bomb Aimer and I know that one other member of the crew (believed to be Engineer) landed between B/A and I, as I saw him walking away from his chute but not heard of since. Fate unknown rest of crew. They should all have got out as had plenty of time to do so. Baled out from Rear Turret and only the Captain left when I went out. Was told by French worker that four Australians and 1 Englishman were shot by German SS near Dortmund. Now this seems to be the fate of my missing crew. Flt Eng. known to have baled out and got to earth safely but unknown of since. Captured at 8am on 4/3/45 by two German Home guards and put in Rhine Airfield Jail. Finished in Stalag V11A and released by American Army on 11/5/45."

FO Willmot reported "Hit by cannon shell from enemy aircraft. Ordered put on chutes. Find mine very large. Baled out at 9000 feet. A/c under control but diving slightly.

Uncertain re fate of crew as probably first clear. Met Rear Gunner in Rhine Airport Jail. Could only walk with difficulty. Went to farm house for assistance and handed over to civil police. Released from Mooseburg by British army on 29/4/45."

Bob Eggins' Lancaster, LM677 (PO-V), was also shot down on the run-in to the target, with only one surviving crew member, on his twelfth mission.  Bob and his crew had survived a scary incident in January: "4/5.1.45, on the op to Royan, the aircraft and crew were involved in a collision with ME300 of 189 Sq near Cognac. The aircraft was out of control and Eggins gave the order to abandon and the crew returned to Waddington in a few days but Sgt Baker.B.F. was injured and had not returned to ops when the crew were lost 3.3.45." 

463 squadron lost Frank Howells in NG469 (JO-D) on his nineteenth operation.  Two months previously, he and his crew had also had a narrow escape: 14/15.1.45. In the attack on Merseburg Leurna in LL865, all went normally until approximately half way round in the supporters run, when the Lancaster was hit by heavy flak putting the hydraulics out of action and the rear and front turrets. They carried on, and on the bombing run were hit again, setting the port inner engine on fire. It was feathered and the fire went out but the bomb doors would only partly open. Then they were attacked by an FW19O fighter which opened fire from approximate 200 yards, hitting the pilot's altimeter and air speed indicator. The mid upper's fire drove him off and he wasn't seen again. They jettisoned the bombs and turned for Base when they were hit again by flak, holing a starboard fuel tank. They then set course for Juvincourt (an emergency airfield in France) after a lot of difficulty, and using the air bottle to get the flaps and undercarriage down, landed at 00.05 hrs.

Of Rolly Ward's crew, a report by the Missing Research and Enquiry Service written by Flt Lt Christie in April 1948 states that: “I contacted farmer Heinrich Langkamp on whose farm the aircraft crashed during the night of 3/4.3.45.  He states that the aircraft was shot down by flak* and was on fire before crashing.  It exploded just prior to, or on impact.  Four bombs exploded between 30 minutes to an hour after the crash.  One bomb made a crater in the middle of the farmyard damaging most of the buildings.  All of the scattered wreckage of this aircraft together with 8 unexploded bombs was taken away by a Luftwaffe unit.  Seven bodies were found, two were taken from the burnt fuselage of the aircraft and five were found up to 150 yards from the scene of the crash.  They were taken to Greven for burial.”  German records state that the bodies were buried as “unknowns” in graves 12 and 13 in the Greven cemetery.  The bodies were exhumed and re-interred at the Reichswald War Cemetery on 29 April 1947.

* I have always been suspicious of this statement made by Herr Langkamp, I couldn't see how he could have known this, the plane coming down by his farm at around 10 o'clock at night 3 miles west of the target, on the run-in whereas the flak defences were alongside the canal or east of it.

The red line shows the route into the target, the yellow marker the postion of ME453's crash-site within planquadrate HQ.

They died, as they had briefly lived, as a close knit crew totally dependent on each other’s skill, vigilance and training, on their third sortie.  A common maxim within operational squadrons was that once a crew clocked up five operations, their chances of surviving a tour of 30 operations substantially improved.  Statistics don’t bear this out, luck played a major factor in the equation of life or death, as the fate of W/Cdr Langlois demonstrates: he was on the eighteenth sortie of his second tour. 

The telegram received by Rolly Ward's parents informing them of his death.