The Dortmund-Ems canal was the most important transport route between the North Sea and the industrial coal-mining and steel-producing area of the Ruhr Valley. Its subsidiary, the Mittelland canal, joins the Dortmund-Ems at Gravenhorst, north of Munster. These canals had been recognised from early on in the war as prime targets – making the canals unnavigable would deprive the Ruhr of vast quantities of materials which were vital to the country’s war effort.
Attacks early on in the war on the canals were with light/medium bombers such as Blenheims and Hampdens, indeed in August 1940 Flight Lieutenant Learoyd of 49 Squadron won Bomber Command’s first VC for pressing home his attack in the face of accurate and withering fire from anti-aircraft guns, for the canals were heavily defended from those earliest days.
However September 1944 saw the start of a new series of effective attacks on the canals, they proved to have an enormous effect on the supply of raw materials to the factories of the Ruhr. The canals were still heavily defended by flak guns, however at this later stage of the war the main threat was posed by nightfighters employing the tactics and radar equipment that had been steadily developing, especially as the Luftwaffe airfields in France, Belgium and the Netherlands caused the Nachtjagd to be withdrawn back into the Homeland. NJG4 was based at Gutersloh and NJG1 to Dortmund, both airfields within easy flying vicinity of the vulnerable aqueduct near Ladbergen.
As its name implies, the canal not only linked the North Sea port of Emden with the Dortmund-Ruhr area but also, through a junction with the Mittelland canal near Gravenhorst, carried all the inland water-borne traffic between the Ruhr and central and eastern Germany. This traffic, which amounted to some thirty million tons a year, consisted largely of coal and coke moving from the Ruhr, and raw materials such as iron ore, being carried to its furnaces and factories.
There was one point where this canal was particularly vulnerable to air attack, namely in the neighbourhood of the town of Ladbergen, where the canal was carried over the River Glane in an aqueduct. Well aware of the danger, the Germans had constructed a second branch also across the river on an aqueduct; thus, should the first be blocked, there would be an alternative channel. At the same time elaborate camouflaging of the course of the Glane was attempted and safety gates were built on both branches of the canal to prevent long stretches being drained by breaching the embankments. Despite many regular and successful bombing raids, the energy with which the Germans set about repairing the waterway gave testimony to its importance. As the movement of coal by rail was more and more restricted through air attack, its transport by canal had become decisive in the maintenance of industry in Germany. Yet, since the end of September 1944, there had been few days when the Germans were able to use these waterways, even though they made the utmost use of those few days by rushing closely packed convoys of barges through the danger points. Throughout all these months, there was an average loss to the central and eastern areas of Germany of some 40,000 tons of coal a day, or the equivalent of fifty trainloads. After the war, Albert Speer (in his book Inside the Third Reich) wrote that of all the strategic attacks made on Germany, the raids on the canals had by far the greatest effect on the German war effort.
This is a target map of the Dortmund-Ems canal in the vicinity of Ladbergen which was issued to crews. The double stretch of the canal is clearly visible in the centre circle.
4/5 November 1944: Dortmund-Ems Canal: 174 Lancasters and 2 Mosquitoes of No 5 Group. three Lancasters lost. The Germans had partly repaired the section of the canal north of Münster after the No 5 Group raid in September, so this further attack was required. The banks of both branches of the canal were again breached and water drained off, leaving barges stranded and the canal unusable. A report from Speer to Hitler, dated 11 November 1944, was captured at the end of the war and described how the bombing of the canal was preventing smelting coke from the Ruhr mines reaching three important steelworks - two near Brunswick and one at Osnabrück.
20/21 February 1945: 154 Lancasters and 11 Mosquitoes of No 5 Group were ordered to attack the Mittelland Canal near Gravenhorst but the raid was ordered to be abandoned by the Master Bomber because the area was covered by cloud. No aircraft lost.
21/22 February 1945: 165 Lancasters and 12 Mosquitoes of No 5 Group again attempted to breach the Mittelland Canal near Gravenhorst. Visibility was clear and the attack was successful. Bomber Command claimed that the canal was rendered '100 per cent unserviceable'. 13 Lancasters were lost, 7.9 per cent of the bombing force.
3/4 March 1945: 212 Lancasters and 10 Mosquitoes of No 5 Group attacked the Ladbergen aqueduct on the Dortmund-Ems Canal, breached it in 2 places and put it completely out of action. 7 Lancasters lost.
This was one of the earliest photographs taken of the Dortmund-Ems canal clearly showing the R. Glane flowing under the viaduct. This was taken in August 1940.
Four years later, in September 1944, the DEK was still under attack, continuing to prove a difficult and costly target.
January 1945, and still the attacks continue. Breaches were caused but the canal was repaired and operating again within weeks, such that it was visited again in February and finally in March.
The circle on the photograph shows the aimimg point, again the R. Glane is clear despite German attempts to disguise its presence.
There was one point where this canal was particularly vulnerable to air attack, namely in the neighbourhood of the town of Ladbergen, where the canal was carried over the River Glane in an aqueduct. Well aware of the danger, the Germans had constructed a second branch also across the river on an aqueduct; thus, should the first be blocked, there would be an alternative channel. At the same time elaborate camouflaging of the course of the Glane was attempted and safety gates were built on both branches of the canal to prevent long stretches being drained by breaching the embankments. Despite many regular and successful bombing raids, the energy with which the Germans set about repairing the waterway gave testimony to its importance. As the movement of coal by rail was more and more restricted through air attack, its transport by canal had become decisive in the maintenance of industry in Germany. Yet, since the end of September 1944, there had been few days when the Germans were able to use these waterways, even though they made the utmost use of those few days by rushing closely packed convoys of barges through the danger points. Throughout all these months, there was an average loss to the central and eastern areas of Germany of some 40,000 tons of coal a day, or the equivalent of fifty trainloads. After the war, Albert Speer (in his book Inside the Third Reich) wrote that of all the strategic attacks made on Germany, the raids on the canals had by far the greatest effect on the German war effort.
This is a target map of the Dortmund-Ems canal in the vicinity of Ladbergen which was issued to crews. The double stretch of the canal is clearly visible in the centre circle.
This was one of the earliest photographs taken of the Dortmund-Ems canal clearly showing the R. Glane flowing under the viaduct. This was taken in August 1940.
Four years later, in September 1944, the DEK was still under attack, continuing to prove a difficult and costly target.
January 1945, and still the attacks continue. Breaches were caused but the canal was repaired and operating again within weeks, such that it was visited again in February and finally in March.
The circle on the photograph shows the aimimg point, again the R. Glane is clear despite German attempts to disguise its presence.