On January 1st 1945, the Luftwaffe launched Operation Bodenplatte (Baseplate), an air-to-ground effort against Allied airpower. More than 800 Luftwaffe aircraft struck about two dozen Allied airfields.
The Bodenplatte attack broke the back of the Luftwaffe. In the course of destroying 232 Allied aircraft on the ground, the Germans lost 280. While only a handful of Allied personnel lost their lives, no fewer than 213 irreplaceable German pilots were killed or captured.
Bomber Command had been targeting German fuel production and reserves for some time (production was reduced from 175000 tonnes in April 1944 to 7000 tonnes the following September and in February 1945 they could only meet 5% of their aviation fuel needs) such that, combined with a growing offensive from the Russians on the Eastern Front, it became inevitable that night fighter (Nachtjagd) operations would be reduced.
The way they achieved this was by Nachtjagdgeschwaders (NJGs) having to rate their crews into three categories, with the 'bottom of the heap' being crews who had achieved no successes. These orders are made clear in the KTB of Stab NJG6, which notes the following:
On 23 January 1945: “With immediate effect, on the grounds of the serious fuel situation, only Spitzenbesatzungen (crews with Abschüsse (aerial victories) to their credit) must be employed. Practice flights, GCI sorties and test flights are to be strictly limited”, and then on 24-25 January: “All crews are to be classified in Category 1 and Category 2 (Spitzenbesatzungen) and a category of non-flying crews. Every Gruppe, on average, will be allocated 20 crews (usually at least 27 crews formed a Gruppe), in the Categories 1 and 2. All other crews must be re-employed in other duties such as ferrying and other flights. The aircraft of the latter category of crews can be struck off charge permanently.”
"Top line" meant crews who had achieved at least one aerial victory (this is evidenced from recorded sorties in the flying logbooks of quite a number of German night fighter crew members). Evidence points to Category 1 crews flying the most, while the Category 2 crews joined the fray when tactical and weather conditions were very favourable. Later in January, in order to save even more fuel, there was a further prohibition from taxying aircraft before and after take off. Another order in early February 1945 stated that nightfighters should only be used in situations that clearly promised success (source: both from ULTRA DEFE 3)
So the situation on the fateful night of 3 March 1945 was that although fewer night fighter aircraft were airborne in defence of the target from NJG 4 based at Gutersloh to the east and NJG 1 at Dortmund to the south, the crews featured some of the top “experten” (aces) of the Luftwaffe including Heinz Schnaufer who finished the war with 121 victories, Hermann Georg Greiner (51 victories), Martin Drewes (52 victories) and Josef Kraft (56 victories).
This is the type of map the German nightfighter pilot would have used, it shows important features such as radio beacons, airfields and flak zones. The letters along the top and left hand side denote the "planquadrate", "HQ" being the target area of the viaduct at Ladbergen and the area where Heinz Schnaufer logged his two abschuss of 3 March, ie probably ME453 and PB806. On take-off from Gutersloh (JR), Schnaufer would probably have been vectored to radio beacon "Ludwig" (GQ) to be in position to intercept the approaching bomber stream: these tactics of GCI (Ground Control Interception) were known as "Zahme Sau" (Tame Boar) whereas freelancing was "Wilde Sau" (Wild Boar). The jamming of German ground-to-air communications was increasingly effective as the war progressed so freelancing became more of the norm. Schnaufer was fortunate in having a very skilful Funker in Fritz Rumpelhardt, to whom Schnaufer gave credit for at least 80 of his victories.
Gutersloh airfield, an aerial photogrpah taken just before the war started. As can be seen, it's a grass airfield with no permanent runways. Points A are refuelling areas, B are slit trenches and C, a compass swinging point with an aircraft in position. Compass swinging involves calibrating the compass, ensuring that no deviation has occurred by moving the aircraft round to true north, and also calibrating any radio-navigation equipment. Any new electrical/magnetic equipment installed in an aircraft, for instance Naxos which could home in on the bombers H2S equipment, required a fresh compass swing. A "Kompensierscheibe" is a large wooden disc that was reinforced by a wooden construction below the disc itself in a (sometimes even almost 2 metres deep) foundation. The entire disc could be moved around by hand power or by a motor located inside the foundation.
Heinz Schnaufer talking to his mechanic, he was meticulous in the way that his own aircraft was maintained and treated. The second photo shows him with Wilhelm Gansler, his flight engineer.
The very "raw" and inexperienced Lancaster crew of ME453 would have stood little chance against such men as these: Schnaufer alone, with his crew menbers Fritz Rumpelhardt and Wilhelm Gansler had completed 164 missions in which he shot down 114 "viermots" (four-engined aircraft.)
Their Bf110G-4 aircraft were fitted with SN-2 Lichtenstein radar and upward-firing cannon, (known as “Schrage musik”). The usual tactic of these fighters, once the target bomber had been detected by the radar operator (bordfunker) was to approach from below and ease into position underneath the bomber in its blindspot. Frequently, the German pilot fired into the wing area between the inner engine and the fuselage, which was where fuel tanks were situated. The first that many crews knew of an attack was their wings erupting with fire; this was almost always fatal for the bomber.
This is the type of map the German nightfighter pilot would have used, it shows important features such as radio beacons, airfields and flak zones. The letters along the top and left hand side denote the "planquadrate", "HQ" being the target area of the viaduct at Ladbergen and the area where Heinz Schnaufer logged his two abschuss of 3 March, ie probably ME453 and PB806. On take-off from Gutersloh (JR), Schnaufer would probably have been vectored to radio beacon "Ludwig" (GQ) to be in position to intercept the approaching bomber stream: these tactics of GCI (Ground Control Interception) were known as "Zahme Sau" (Tame Boar) whereas freelancing was "Wilde Sau" (Wild Boar). The jamming of German ground-to-air communications was increasingly effective as the war progressed so freelancing became more of the norm. Schnaufer was fortunate in having a very skilful Funker in Fritz Rumpelhardt, to whom Schnaufer gave credit for at least 80 of his victories.
Gutersloh airfield, an aerial photogrpah taken just before the war started. As can be seen, it's a grass airfield with no permanent runways. Points A are refuelling areas, B are slit trenches and C, a compass swinging point with an aircraft in position. Compass swinging involves calibrating the compass, ensuring that no deviation has occurred by moving the aircraft round to true north, and also calibrating any radio-navigation equipment. Any new electrical/magnetic equipment installed in an aircraft, for instance Naxos which could home in on the bombers H2S equipment, required a fresh compass swing. A "Kompensierscheibe" is a large wooden disc that was reinforced by a wooden construction below the disc itself in a (sometimes even almost 2 metres deep) foundation. The entire disc could be moved around by hand power or by a motor located inside the foundation.
Heinz Schnaufer talking to his mechanic, he was meticulous in the way that his own aircraft was maintained and treated. The second photo shows him with Wilhelm Gansler, his flight engineer.
The very "raw" and inexperienced Lancaster crew of ME453 would have stood little chance against such men as these: Schnaufer alone, with his crew menbers Fritz Rumpelhardt and Wilhelm Gansler had completed 164 missions in which he shot down 114 "viermots" (four-engined aircraft.) 
Their Bf110G-4 aircraft were fitted with SN-2 Lichtenstein radar and upward-firing cannon, (known as “Schrage musik”). The usual tactic of these fighters, once the target bomber had been detected by the radar operator (bordfunker) was to approach from below and ease into position underneath the bomber in its blindspot. Frequently, the German pilot fired into the wing area between the inner engine and the fuselage, which was where fuel tanks were situated. The first that many crews knew of an attack was their wings erupting with fire; this was almost always fatal for the bomber.