Operational Training Units (OTUs) were bases where the various "trades" that comprised a bomber crew were brought together to train as an efficient team.
For a group of men whose very existence was to depend on each others' skills, vigilance and reliability, their formation as a "team" was usually a remarkably haphazard affair. All the individuals who would shortly form crews were assembled in a room: pilots, navigators, bomb-aimers, wireless operators and air gunners, and told to sort themselves into crews.
This could be based simply on somebody looking "keen", on a previous friendship or encounter, a recommendation or any other, sometimes random factor. Odd as this system may seem, it normally worked quite well, though some men inevitably changed crews for a variety of reasons. Cy March's first crew was disbanded because of friction between his pilot and navigator. Cy was allocated to another crew, with whom he saw the war out, after they had "sacked" their rear gunner.
The standard aircraft that was flown at OTU was a Vickers Wellington. These aircraft were widely used by Bomber Command earlier in the war on operations over Germany, but were phased out of front-line service as the four-engined heavies were introduced to squadrons. The Wellingtons were subsequently sent to OTUs for training purposes.
Rolly, Tom and Colin, probably taken whilst at 29 OTU, based on the fact that Rolly was a flight sergeant.
A typical crew, including Sgt Weir, proudly standing in front of "their" Wellington at No. 28 OTU Wymeswold, early 1944. (With thanks to Simon Weir for permission to use the photo.)
Below are extracts from mid-upper gunner Bill Chatter's logbook for their time at Bruntingthorpe:
Note Rolly's first solo in a Wimpy, and Bill's air firing of 600 rounds.
C.C.G. means Cine Camera Gun: this may have been "firing" at an "attacking" aircraft, known a Fighter Affiliation (FA).
Much of the flying to date has been circuits and landings, simply flying round the airfield and bringing the aircraft in, then going off again. Only on this page is any night flying done, preceded by a 15 minute check of Rolly's competency. The next exercise was High Level Bombing which included a night fighter affiliation (NFA).
This marked a new phase in the training which included longer navigational exercises, often having to dogleg from one point to another.
The first cross-country (X.C.) was dual with a screened operational pilot and included air gunnery, the flight lasting 3 hours 10 minutes. The entry for "self tow" was a target drogue which was winched out directly astern of the Wellington, which the rear gunner then fired at. The final entry on this page was a Solo Flashlight and NFA, effectively a cross-country navigational exercise which included "attacking" a city protected by searchlights - thus giving the crew a realistic idea of what it was like to be "coned" or tracked by searchlights, and to attempt to evade them.
OTU was a critical time in the formation of the crew, a time when absolute trust could be established, or destroyed. Sometimes, tragically, that trust was not given a second chance as illustrated in the case below from a crew on Course 46, the same course as Rolly's crew:
Wellington Mk III BK552 of 29 OTU piloted by South African F/O D De V Clarke, took off from Bruntingthorpe for a cross country flight on 8th September 1944. It was scheduled to fly from Base to Northampton - Fishguard - St Tudwal's (lighthouse) - Skegness - Boston - Newbury - Tetbury - Northampton - Base. At 13.30 it was observed diving from 1500 feet into the ground at Mile Oak, Maesbury Road, near Oswestry. All the crew were killed.
F/O D De V Clarke SAAF P/O H J Homes Sgt D E Manning Sgt C Taylor F/S T D Potter RAAF Sgt N E Walker Sgt J S A Nicholson
The airframe of the Wellington had 669.30 hours flying time logged, and whilst the port engime had been installed on 7 July 1942, the starboard engine was fitted only 4 weeks previously on 6th August. The primary cause, pending the Board of Enquiry, appeared to be a single engine failure, . The pilot had logged 26 hours on Wellingtons, 7 of them at night and 140 hours of all types of aircraft, 40 of them at night, proving that he was quite an experienced pilot.
However, the Board of Enquiry found that "It would appear that the pilot lost control of his aircraft because of icing conditions in the cumulo-nimbus cloud. Special emphasis was made at briefing that all cloud above the freezing level was to be avoided at all costs, and on (sic) return to base made if cloud could not be flown over or around."
It went on to say: "During a day cross-country when severe icing conditions existed it was assumed that the pilot flew above high cumulus and cumulo-nimbus cloud and experienced engine failure. In view of the conditions, crews were carefully briefed to avoid cloud, and if necessary, turn back. This pilot experienced engine failure above high cloud and descended into it. The aircraft became iced up and it is assumed the pilot lost control. One eye witness observed (an) aircraft diving on one engine. Three incidents of this nature on this unit during the past twelve months disclose that the pilots were Rhodesians or South Africans."
The Station Commander concurred: "I agree with the remarks.....It must be assumed that the primary cause of the incident is the result of the pilot carrying on above cloud, when he should have cancelled the detail, and returned to Base. Engine failure should have been taken into consideration by the Captain. Briefing for this exercise left no doubt as to what captains should have done."
Dan Conway was an Australian pilot who also trained at 29 OTU. In his autobiography "The Trenches in the Sky" he writes about the fickle finger of fate that could so easily have pointed at any one of the trainee crews, an engine failure at the wrong time, a mid-air collision in the crowded skies are examples of the things that could, and did, happen all too often.
Dan and his crew so nearly joined the list of OTU crews who were logged as "missing" on a night cross-country with no clue as to their fate. On this particular occasion, Dan was briefed to fly a series of legs which started with a north-easterly to the (east) coast, then a long leg south-westerly to Wales, then a northerly followed by a short south-easterly to Base. The weather became turbulent over the first three legs which meant flying on instruments all the way. They had begun their descent on the final leg when the navigator asked for a reversal of course. He admitted that he had been sick some time ago and had lost track of their course. The wireless operator was asked for a QDM (a bearing to follow to Base) but the set was playing up so no bearing could be obtained. This meant they were well and truly lost.
The next strategy was to call "Darky", this meant circling over one spot calling "Darky, Darky" repeated over the radio telephone in the hopes of alerting the Air Observer Organisation, who would institute searchlights being turned on as a guide to an airfield. The night was so dark they could not determine whether they were in cloud or not, and the Darky call produced no results which led Dan to think they were over the Welsh mountains, and having been flying for seven hours, they were almost at the limit of the fuel reserves. At this point Dan spotted a light below through a small gap in the clouds which looked like an airfield beacon, but it disappeared almost immediately. They descended very gradually and finally identifed the beacon as Jurby in the Isle of Man. Had Dan not seen this brief light of hope, he would have ordered the crew to bale out, thinking they were over land. Instead, the crew and the aircraft would have ended up in the stormy waters of the Irish Sea.
Small wonder then that Dan Conway says:
"Those losses in training of men and machines were a serious drain on the resources of the nation. As aircrew involved in the program we accepted the situation and did our best. When we did get to the squadrons, we felt ourselves to some extent to be survivors. We were proved right in this conjecture, as 5327 were killed and 3113 injured during training in Bomber Command throughout the war."
Flight engineers, and sometimes the second air-gunner, joined the crew at the next stage in training, the Heavy Conversion Unit (HCU) where they would begin to experience the four-engined bomber rather than the twin-engined Wellingtons. They arrived at Swinderby on 24 October 1944.
The Short Stirling, showing just how high the pilot's position is from the ground. Also notice the extremely long undercarriage legs, these were prone to sheer under stress. Photo from RAF Museum.
The Stirling had a new and complex electrical system for the crews to learn, for many of the aircraft's services such as the Gouge flaps and the ponderous undercariage were electrically driven. So the first two weeks at HCU were at ground school cramming all that was possible to learn about Exactor hydraulic controls, DR compasses, petrol, pneumatic, electrical and hydraulic systems. Also practised during those first weeks were emergency drills and the associated equipment.
Murray Peden recalls (my paraphrasing): "Once flying training actually commenced, the first thing that pupil pilots were shown was the marked tendency for the Stirling to swing on take-off. If all the throttles were advanced evenly as the plane gathered speed, it would soon go off the runway at which point the undercarriage would unevitably collapse. The secret, trainee pilots were taught, was to stagger the throttles by opening both starboard throttles well in advance of the port side ones. Another endearing characteristic of the Stirling was that it dropped like a brick when coming into land, there was no "flare out" or float (like they would experience on a Lancaster). Landing a Stirling was critical - checking (cutting the throttles) the plane six-inches above the runway would result in a beautiful landing, checking it eighteen inches above produced a "firm" landing, a twenty-four inch check made it feel as if the undercarriage was being driven through the wings."
Whilst they were at Swinderby, there was a crash which killed several of their fellow airmen. It is explained in W.R.Chorley's Bomber Command Losses Vol. 8 as follows:
"Stirling III EF201 took off at 10.15 for a cross-country exercise, an exercise that soon became dogged with engine problems. Initially, the difficulties were confined to the port outer, which was feathered (effectively turned off) but soon after the inner port began to over speed and F/O Craig, the pilot, attempted to restart the outer motor. Unfortunately, due to a fuel cock being left off, he was unsuccessful and the windmilling blades created such a drag that he lost control. Thus, at 11.20, the Stirling came down near Northleach airfield in Gloucestershire. Out of the crew of nine on this particular flight, five were killed."
A measure of the difficulties of flying and maintaining the Stirling, which had largely been withdrawn from front-line service because of its relatively small bomb-load and inability to climb to the heights that most bombers were attaining, is shown by the fact that in the period from January 1942 to January 1945, a total of 208 aircraft were lost in training accidents alone. (Photo courtesy of Gareth Stringer and the IWM)
The crew's first training flights at HCU. It had been decided between Bill and Tom that Bill would be the mid-upper and Tom the rear gunner.
Exercise 16 was a "Bullseye" followed by High Level Bombing, this was one step on from the "Flashlight" that they has done at OTU in that it included a proper briefing and was as close as possible to the real thing that they were shortly to encounter over enemy territory.
Their time at HCU finished with a solo fighter affiliation.
Lisa Sharp, who helps maintain the Canadian flying Lancaster, has sent me a copy of her Grandfather's "little black book" inwhich he jotted down significant dates in his career in the RCAF, accompanied by some pithy comments in places. Lisa has given me permission to include some excerpts, not least because time-wise F/O W J (Bill) Smith (Smitty to his crew) was a contemporary of Rolly and his crew. Bill is in the centre of the middle row, shown during his preliminary training in Canada.
I have typed out Bill's notes for clarity: May 18/1944 Left Bournemouth on draft to new PRC Gloucester. Pretty grim outlook.
May 23/1944 Left Gloucester for 21 Pilots AFU Wheaton Aston Staffordshire, course ten weeks, pretty nice location, now converting to twins – Oxfords.
(1534 BAT Course Shawbury 6/27/44)
Aug 1st 1944 Left Wheaton Aston, finished AFU course, posted to satellite Perton reserve flight for posting to OTU.
Aug 8th 1944 Posted to 22 OTU Wellesbourne Mountford, Warwickshire. Flying Wellingtons, pretty grim outlook. Received F/O 17th Sept 44.
See below for Bill's notes.
21st Oct 1944 Finished OTU, on nine days leave, reporting to 61 Base Dalton Yorkshire for Commando(?) training. I didn’t think conditions could be worse but they are. What a hellhole.
Dec 9th 1944 Posted to 1664 HCU (Con unit) on Halifaxes, doing first seven days ground school. Conditions on a par with Dalton.
Dec 19th Finished ground school, behind flying so go on nine days leave over Xmas to London. Return Dec 27th.
Feb 3rd 1945 Completed course on Halifaxes. Above average.
Feb 5th Posted to 419 squadron on Lancasters, Middleton St George, the Moose Squadron.
21st Feb 1945 Did first op. as second dickie to Duisberg Germany.
27th Feb Did first op. with my own crew as first pilot on daylight to Mainz.
16th April 1945 Did 16th trip and last one as the Armistice was signed, it was to Schwandorf Germany. Armistice signed May 8th 1945