In the thrust and counter-thrust of this airborne war, there had been, since the earliest days, a continual evolution in the battle of tactical wits and electronic aids to ensure the safety of the crews and the success of their missions
Bomber Command had developed a pattern of sending in a shallow penetration raid for example to the Ruhr, followed by the main raid of much deeper penetration such as Berlin. Often the deeper penetration raids would enter Germany either from the south or via Denmark and the Baltic in the north. With the southern incursions, there were a number of occasions when deep penetrations were made without a huge Nachtjagd response because either resources were focused on another raid or the stream size and course wasn't fully appreciated by the controllers.
However it is obvious that the Bomber Command planners occasionally tried this tactic too often so that what may have worked initially, later failed with the result that Luftwaffe controllers could successfully direct the night fighters to infiltrate the bomber stream with high resultant losses. But generally, it appears that the major difficulty was with the controllers correctly appreciating the main raids in time to effect an interception. Very rarely during 1945 was interception in force made before the bombers reached the target (being mostly either over the target or along the return route) but when it did happen the bomber losses were significant.
No. 100 Group RAF was a specialist organisation formed on 11 November 1943 to counter enemy radar and electronic defences against Bomber Command operations. The group controlled eight airfields with 260 aircraft, 140 of which were various marks of de Havilland Mosquito night fighter intruders and the remainder being 80 Handley Page Halifaxes, 20 Boeing B-17 Fortresses and 20 Consolidated B-24Liberators carrying electronic jamming equipment.
The end of January 1945 saw the beginning of large scale use of land-based jamming on the continent, virtually in the Nachtjagd's back yard, by No. 80 Group, effectively increasing the range of both monitoring and jamming. As the Allies advanced, these ground units also moved forward, however unfortunately it didn't stop the Nachtjagd having occasional successes during February and March that cost the crews of Bomber Command dearly.
On this night, 100 Group operated 82 Mosquitoes, Halifaxes, Fortresses, Liberators and Stirlings in the Bomber Support role, viz:
A 'Mandrel' jamming screen consisting of 12 Halifaxes and 4 Stirlings
A 'Window' patrol towards Ladbergen consisting of 6 Fortresses, 2 Liberators and 1 Halifax
A feint attack towards Meppen consisted of 6 Mosquitoes and 10 Halifaxes
6 Halifaxes, 2 Fortresses, and 2 Mosquitoes accompanied the main forces to perform 'Piperack' and/or 'Jostle' jamming.
A further 8 Mosquitoes and Halifaxes performed Signals Patrols. In addition, 17 Fighter Command Mosquitoes conducted intruder operations, while 18 USAAF Liberators attacked Emden, as part of diversionary measures
One 100 Group report states that German night fighters were known to be controlled on 16 different wireless telegraphy (W/T) frequencies - 6 high frequency channels (4 of which were jammed with both 'Drumstick' and 'Jostle', and one jammed by 'Jostle' alone) and 10 medium frequency channels (six different radio beacons were jammed with 'Fidget', two other broadcasts were jammed with 'W/T Dartboard'). Radio Telephony (R/T) channels were jammed via 'Corona' and 'Special Tinsel'.
No. 80 Wing, based on the ground in continental Europe, was also active in monitoring and jamming German radars and communications.
With thanks to Rod Mackenzie for much of the above.
